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*, After the general strike of July 1913 on the Witwatersrand
the Transvaal trade unions (most of which were craft unions)
under the auspices of the Transvaal Federation of Trade Unions . "
presented a statement of their grievances in a document entitled
•The Workers/ Charter1. These reveal, that white workers, particu-
\ larly mineworkers, had deep-seated grievances. There were pre-
cedents for all,their demands, and 'The Workers' Charter• could
• have been, a document drafted by trade unionists anywhere in the : '
.world. Some of these demands however reveal the maj.or unstated"
;;:';;••" •'"•-• aim, that of preventing non-white encroachment in skilled, semi-
skilled and even unskilled occupations^(1)
. Partisan writers of South African trade-union histories, such
as I. Walker and B. Weinbren, and E. Gitsham and J.F. Trembath,
have tended to gloss over the fact that one of the reasons why
^ white miners went on strike in 1907 and miners and all other
" mineworfcers went on strike in 1913, was because they were aggrieved
by non-white encroachment, particularly by Africans (and also by
the Chinese in 1907) who were paid low contract wages.(2) On
the other hand, other writers, for instance H,J. and R.E. Simons,
in their determination to emphasise the demands of the trade union-
ists for the extension of the colour bar, have tended to play
down the fact that white workers had many other grievances, many
of which had no connection whatsoever with non-white competition,(3)
F. Wilson goes even futher than Simons and Simons. He makes
the facile assumption;that the sole reason why miners went on
strike in 1907 was to 'prevent blacks doing skilled jobs•.(4)
R.K. Cope in his book, Comrade Bill- a biography of Bill Andrews, •
•** a prominent official in the Amalgamated Society of Engineers before
his election as a Labour representative to the Union house of
• assembly in 1912, gives the most balanced picture, but one which
is lacking in the necessary supportive detail.(5)
The objects of this paper are to try to assess mineworkers1
grievances in 1913j by ah analysis of 'The Workers' Charter1; and
also to indicate that the Chamber of Mines, although it was
. opposed to the legal colour bar, helped to perpetuate the colour bar
through its low wage policy for Africans.(6)
After the general strike the government agreed that many of
the workers' enumerated grievances were valid and promised to
rectify them without further enquiry. Six industrial bills were
drafted for the 1914 parliamentary session.(7) Some of the other
demands however were considered to be controversial and it was
for this reason that the Economic Commission was appointed in the
latter half of 1913,(8)
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Trade unionists were initially opposed to the appointment of
yet another commission, because numerous commissions which had
sat from 1907-1913 had made recommendations to alleviate the lot
of the white workers, but the government had ignored their findings,
(9) However the personnel of the Economic Commission, under the ; •
chairmanship of S.J. Chapman, a professor of economics from
Manchester University,, was higly regarded, and the trade unions ; ,'
willingly submitted evidence. (10) This evidence was of great .-'••• .'>.-•
• . - were entirely -
assistance to the commission because commissions of enquiry/ de- .•
pendent on the goodwill of those members of the public who were / : -"•'•-.
prepared to volunteer such information, particularly as there was
almost a complete lack of statistical information relating to
industrial conditions.(11) The department of mines was the one
well-organised administrative unit which had collected figures f*
about the distribution of the labour force and wages earned on the
mines.(12) But no investigation had been made into the cost of
living, an important item for assessing the 'adequacy of money wages.
(13) Despite the absence of statistics relating to the cost of
living, the Economic Commission laboured conscientiously to make
a survey of living costs throughout South Africa. Yet some of
its findings were critcised and rejected by a special enquiry in
1914 under the auspices of W.G.J. Hill, assistant superintendent
of the South African Railways.(14) South African craft unions
laid down their district standard rates of wages by evaluating
the cost of living applicable to the different regions. In the
absence of reliable statistics and in the face of many conflicting
and often contradictory opinions about the cost of living, f^>.
acceptable wages and working hours, it is difficult to generalise /-
about the validity of white working-class grievances as a whole.
Often• the only recourse has been to assess grievances about
specific cases in order to determine their validity.
Trade unionists complained that the. Transvaal Industrial
Disputes Prevention Act of 1909 operated against their interests. ;
Although there had been frequent requests for dispute settling •
machinery before 1907,. the miners' strike of 1907 convinced the
government; that such legislation was essential, but two years were
to elapse before its enactment.(15) Trade unionists complained
that the act was obscure.(16) Within three years of its pro-
mulgation it was discovered that the act did not in fact ensure
the automatic recognition of trade unions.(17) There was am-
biguity as to whether conciliation boards could be appointed to
investigate changes in working conditions which affected less than
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ten people.(18) The recommendations of the conciliation boards
had no force and employers frequently ignored them,(19)
In February 1910 the minister of mines refused to appoint a
concilation board in a dispute at the Geduld Gold Mine when over-
time rates were abolished, on the ground that rates of pay and
hours had not been altered. The employees regarded this answer
as technical and verbal fault-finding, and believed that the act
was of no use to them. (20) A similar request was turned down
again in 1911 at Randfontein Estates.(21)
In 1911 a new contract system on the Aurora West altered the
wages
minimum/of stopers and developers. This change affected fifteen
men who sent two affidavits requesting a conciliation board.
Management claimed that the law required each application to be
signed by ten employees, whereas these two forms had been signed
by eight and seven miners respectively.(22) Although a
conciliation board was appointed and found in favour oi* the men,
management rejected its "findings.(23 )
By far the most serious incident occurred in 1912, when many
mines introduced new contract forms absolving the companies from
having to provide contract-miners with reasonable facilities.(24)
The Chamber of Mines successfully opposed the Transvaal Miners1
Association's handling of the case on the ground that the union
had no legal standing(25) Requests for conciliation boards had
thus to be submitted separately for each mine, irrespective of the
numbers affected* A board was appointed for the Ferreira Deep.
At the; board meeting the representative of the Ferreira Deep Mine
refused to communicate with the miners1 representative; and the
majority's findings which favoured the men were once again ignored*
The trade unions found themselves without legal recognition and
the finances of the Transvaal Miners1 Association(T.M.A.) were de-
pleted by £600 as a result of the court case- a case which
F.S. Malanj minister of mines, had encouraged the T.M.A. to pursue.
(26) A wave of revulsion against the Industrial Disputes
Prevention Act spread" over the goldfields, and mineworkers believed
 :
that unless it were completely revised they would have no alterna-
tive but to strike in defiance of the act. Malan was well-aware
of the discontent but made no efforts to obviate the shortcomings
of the act in the 1913 parliamentary session. •
Ever since the strike of mineworkers (artisans) on the- Crown
Deep in 1902 the Chamber of Mines and the management of all the
mines had adopted a policy of refusing to negotiate with any trade-
union officials. This meant that there were no channels of
communication between management and its employees, and individual
mineworkers, particularly active trade unionists, were loath to
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register complaints for fear of being victimised.(27) Unpaid
union branch secretaries were so frequently dismissed that the
monthly report of the Amalgated Society of Engineers (A.S.E.) in
 :
1911 warned its members not to visit branch secretaries at their
places of work.(28) In 1912 the South African Council - the
executive of the A.S.E. - ceased to publish the names and , V V
addresses of branch secretaries in Donaldson's South African .'•.-. ./-.
Directory for fear of jeopardising these members'jobs.(29) .
Mineworkers dared not express their political views, even after ;
. long years of service on a particular mine, especially after the V
establishment of the South African Labour Party (S.A.L.P.) in 1910.
In 1912 Robert Burns Waterston, organising secretary of the
South African Engine Drivers' and Firemen's Association, declared "
that if the head of the mine was a 'Unionist1 a mineworkers dared
not admit to being a 'Nationalist•.(3O) J. Mulvey, a prominent
member of the A.S.E., believed that his dismissal from his job,
following his election as a Labour Pary member of the Johannesburg
town council, was the result of victimisation for his political
beliefs.(31)
The Economic Commission stressed the necessity for the recogni-
tion of trade unions and the value of negotiation by paid union
officials with management. The commissioners also acknowledged
the importance of discussion by employers with officials from the
Federation - a suggestion which the Chamber had formally and
totally opposed - especially when trade unions could not afford
paid officers. The commissioners also stressed the fact that
the appointment of a conciliation board should be regarded only : .
as 'a final resort', and that this should only occur after all
attempts at negotiation- which they regarded as the primary agency
for settling disputes - had failed.(32) Although legislation
for the recognition of trade unions was drafted in 1914, the bill
was hot enacted and only in 1924 were trade unions formally and
legally recognised in South Africa.(33)
Trade unionists were also aggrieved by the Transvaal Workmen's/''.
Compensation Act of 1907 and requested uniform legislation for the ;V
four provinces. The major shortcoming of the Transvaal act lay
in the provision which obliged a plaintiff to establish his claim :
for damages by proving that he was the victim of negligence caused
either by a fellow-worker or his employers. (34). Unless a worker
received legal assistance this was frequently impossible to prove.
(35) In addition, as a variety of magistrates dealt with lawsuits
under this act there were discrepancies in evaluating compensation,
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particularly in cases of 'disfigurement1 or 'partial disablement1.
C36) in one case an 'engineer' who lost the sight of an eye
was awarded the partial disablement compensation prescribed by the
act of £250; but in two other cases in the same year different
magistrates declared that the loss of an eye did not incapacitate a
carpenter and a drill-sharpener, both of whom lost their cases. (37)
Accident victims had the choice of applying., for compensation
under the Transvaal Workmen's Compensation Act or under common
law.(38) Secretaries of insurance or mining companies frequently
visited injured workmen in hospital when they were barely conscious,
and contrived to secure their signatures by promising them half-
pay for lost time, a right to which workmen were already entitled. ;.
By signing this document victims signed away their rights under
common law in terms of which higher compensation was ofter awarded
than the maximum of £500 to which they were entitled under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.(3)". Trade unions constantly advised
their members not to sign any forms presented by 'curs' until they
had either consulted legal opinion or decided under which law
they wished to proceed.(40)
In .1914- after the general strike - a Workmen's Compensation
Act applicable to the four provinces was passed which,in addition,
removed the major disadvantages of the earlier Transvaal act.
Workmen no longer had to prove the employer's negligence and were
given the right to proceed against the principal.(41)
Although the Transvaal Ordinance No. .12 of 1904 protected,
workers' wages from being garnished in excessive amounts by
magistrates, a loophole in the law permitted the supreme court
to attach a worker's entire wage thus bypassing the lower courts.
(42) It was therefore not surprising that trade unionists de-
manded a bill regulating a lien on their wages. The validity
of their demand was recognised in 1914 - again after the general
strike - by the Workmen's-Wages Protection Act. (43) This act
also included a long-requested provision that wages had to be
paid weekly.(43). The Economic Commission also supported this
request finding that the practice of paying workers monthly en-
couraged them to buy on credit- a system which they often abused- ... j
and tended to raise the already high cost of living.(44)
It was the general strike which made the government realise
that it could no longer shelve the enactment of legislation for
the regulation of industrial conditions, as it had done in the
'case of the Factory Bill of 1912-(45) The ambitious programme of
draft legislation for the 1914 parliamentary session, already
commented on, also included a Factories Bill which was only
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enacted in 1918.(46) All these suggestions had previously been
discussed in parliament at the instigation of the Labour Party,
but had been rejected from 1910 to 1913 as 'socialistic nostrums1.
(47) ;
The demand for the legal enactment of a 'National Eight Hour
Day1 (or alternatively the forty-eight hour week) was a major
reform requested by trade unions all over the world. By 1913
skilled artisans on the witwatersrand did not work excessively
long hours. Fifty-one hours a week was the maximum worked on.
most mines and in private industries, while the forty-eight hour
week already obtained in several large firms. (48) Skilled
workers on the mines wished to receive 2s.6d. per hour and re-
sented being paid not by the hour but by the shift. In practice
this meant that artisans * '" received £1 per day irrespective
were •
of the number of hours they worked, as they/seldom paid extra
for overtime. Furthermore when overtime rates obtained, they .
were still calculated at 2s.6d. per* hour.(49) The system of
calculating a worker's wages by the shift and not by the hour was
open to abuse. For instance, it was the custom on the Charltoh
and Meyer Mine in 1911 to work five long shifts on week-days and
a short shift on Saturdays, for which they received £6 per week.
On several occasions the manager informed artisans that he did
not require their services on Saturdays with the result that the
men received only £5 per week.(50)
In contrast to the skilled artisans, pumpmen on the surface
worked hours which ranged from fifty-eight to seventy hours per
week, a practice which the Economic Commission believed necessi-
tated state intervention, unless management voluntarily reduced
- ' • • • • •
these excessive hours.(51) The evidence given before the
Economic Commission in no way corroborated the Report of the
Select Committee on the Subject Matter of the Eight Hours Bill.
This committee, appointed by the Transvaal legislative assembly
 :"••
in 1908, rejected the legal enactment.of the eight-hour day for ;
the reason that, apart from'mining and agriculture, the principle-
had been voluntarily adopted in private industry.(52) Trade r.
unionists indicated that far from this being the case in many ^c-
instances the reverse was true. Women and children employed
by the Argus Company, for instance, often worked fifteen to six-
teen hours a day in over-crowded, badly-lit rooms without being
paid any overtime.(53) Furthermore it was alleged that employers
abused the Transvaal Shop Hours Act by requiring employees to
work longer than nine hours a day(or fifty-four hours a week).(54)
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These abuses were substantiated by the Economic Commission,
which advised strict inspection and enforcement of the Shop Hours
Act and the promulgation of legislation to provide a maximum
week of fifty hours for all 'employees in factories and workshops,
including those on the mines. (55) In addition, the Ecomonic
Commission recommended the payment of additional' rates for overtime,
and stressed that unless the amount of overtime was restricted,
hours of work tended to become so elastiq that additonal hours
were accepted as part of the normal working day.(56) The "':".:
Economic Commission also agreed with trade unionists that night '':.•••••••
shifts should be shorter than day shifts, but paid for at the
same rates. (57) The commissioners advised that all these re- .
commendations should be implemented by state legislation, a re-
quest which the trade unionists had constantly reiterated.(58)
The demand for the.eight-hour day particularly concerned .
all underground mineworkers- Evidence submitted by the trade
unions in 1907 to the Transvaal Mining Industry Commission and
the Transvaal Mining Regulations Commission made the authorities
aware that the mortality due to miners * phthisis was far greater
than had been imagined- In 1907 miners who went on strike de-
clared that managements action in obliging them to supervise three
instead of one or two drilling-machines would result in their
succumbing to the disease far more rapidly in mines which were
already notorious as death traps-(59) By 1907 it was abundantly
clear that regulations introduced to prevent phthisis were not be- •
ing observed either by the men or management- Miners found the
respirators uncomfortable, while few mining companies had intro-
duced water sprays to prevent dust clouds«(60)
In 1908 the Transvaal department of mines took immediate steps
to introduce and enforce regulations to diminish the dust under-
ground. But by 1910 miners themselves were still negligent about
observing safety precautions, and inspectors were lax in enforcing .
regulations.(61) In 1911, on the recommendation of the Mining
Regulations Commission, a sanatorium for incapacitated miners was1
established at Springkell.(62) \
This beneficial step did hot solve the more urgent preventative
problems, and in 1911 the Mines and Works Act made it a punishable
offence for underground workers to work more than eight hours
at the face of the mine, exclusive of the time taken to convey '
mineworkers to and from the bank(the surface) of the mine.(63)
The system was open to abuse and frequently men at underground
waiting staions were exposed to an atmosphere thick with dust and
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nitrous fumes for periods varying from one to two hours.(64)
In 1912 the miners•'phthisis prevention committee recommended
that miners should be 'absolutely prohibited1 from returing to the
face during the same shift after blasting; but by 1914 this abuse
was still prevalent.(65) In thirty-two mines, which by 1913 .
worked a single shift of eight hours a day, the dust hazard
was considerably reduced. However in the remaining twenty-three"
mines mineworkers were exposed to dust which had not settled after
blasting,when.they came to work during the second or third shifts.
(66) Both the Mining Regulations Commission and the Economic
Commission recommended that-'only one shift per day should be . '.
worked.(67)
With the introduction of improved techniques the Chamber
complacently stated that there was little 'risk1 of contracting
phthisis, and adopted the policy that 'things are good enough1.(68)
But in 1911 Richard Barry, the manager of Nourse Mines,observed
to his uncle John X.Merriman, a former prime minister of the Cape
Colony: . ,.
People have been slow to realise what ravages this disease
has made and is making and even today the efforts to eradi-
cate it on a great number of mines are of the flimsiest
nature... the terrible thing... is that it will take at
least 7 years from the date upon which the whole community
starts
seriously trying to really achieve any noticeable
results since as things stand today we are perpetually
manufacturing fresh victims who will be with us for some
such period as 7 yeafs«(69) .
Mineworkers were all too well-aware that, despite the innova-
tions and efforts of the authorities, phthisis was a factor in their
the . .
daily lives, and scorned/assurance of the Chamber of Mines that
it was a 'thing of the past*.(70) In September 1913 Barry
stated that phthisis was a '4far bigger factor than even the men '•';;•:•
are aware1.(71) In December 1913. Thomas Mathews, general
secretary of the T.M.A*, reported that as many as eleven applicants
a day were appealing to the miners1 phthisis board for compensation.
(72) MatjiewsV-s figures were roughly borne put by those of
B.de Witt Hamer, the'secretary of the board, who calculated that ;
•over seven' men each day from 1 August 1912 to 1 March 1914 hadi
applied for compensation.(73) '." '
Contrary to the general belief, the medical commission on
miners• phthisis asserted that all underground workers, not merely
miners, were susceptible to the disease.(74) The drill-sharpeners,
aware of this before 1910, had urged the Mining.Regulations
—9—
Commission to recommend their working on the surface, a view
which they reiterated in 1913. The mining regulations of 1911,
which permited drill-sharpeners to continue working underground
in places not 'deleterious to health1, had been abused by
management* (75) ••]
Mangement refused to pay underground workers extra rates for
overtime on the grounds that men should be dissuaded from per-
forming overtime as it endangered their health. This rationalis-
 ;
ation was completely refuted by Barry who stated, 'Health is used
as a cloak now again but always only to shield the alternative
of higher pay.•(76) After working with the committee appointed .
by the Chamber of Mines to collect evidence for the Economic
Commission Barry was astpuhded by the amount of overtime performed
underground. He alleged that if access had been allowed to the
books of the Randfontein and Barnato groups in the first quarter
of 1913 'when no-one was on their guard1 and 'before they were
altered', it would be clearly seen that management was 'deliberately
breaking the law...aided and abetted undoubtedly by the men
themselves1. (77)
The trade unions • demand for eight hours bank to bank had
considerable merit, because, as has been indicated, the eight
hours' face to face regulation was open to abuse. If this pro-
. to
vxsion was to be strictly observed, it was necessary/limit by
regulation, as trade unionists requested, the time (half an hour)
taken to raise and lower men to/ n from the surface. The Economic
Commission recommended the adoption of this principle, which was
one which the Chamber of Mines had rejected in 1912 for the
reason that it would be impossible to ensure that such a modifies- -
tion to the Mines and Works Act could be applied to Africans as
w e l l . ( 7 8 ) ••" " " • •
Trade.unionists objected to the Miners' Phthisis Act of 1912
because they believed that it should have been incorporated in the
Transvaal Workmens Compensation Act, under which awards for
.were , * .
compensation/. , much higher.(79) In terms of the Miners1
Phthisis Act mineworkers were obliged to contribute to the general
fund, which awarded £8 per month for one year (or a lump sum of
£96), or £8 per month for five years (or a lump sum of £400)f if
miners suffered from phthisis in the 'first' or'advanced stages
respectively. Officials in the department of mines agreed with
members of the trade unions that £8 per month was insufficient
for a married man to live on. (80)
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As a result of this 'paltry compensation1, workers afflicted
by the disease wittingly committed the offence of not reporting
their illness until they had phthisis in the advanced stages
preferring'death by phthisis1 to death by 'starvation1, because
it was virtually impossible for a man who had contracted the
disease, even if he had recovered from it, to secure any kind ^
of work whatsoever thereafter,(81) *
i
The insecurity of workers on the goldfields was exacerbated . . ;.
by the alleged lack of sympathy not only of management but also
by government officials. Miners who in 1907 and 1913 requested ; ^
representation on the board of examiners, for blasting certificates
did so in the belief that this would free them from their de-
pendence on their good-standing with shift bosses, shift captains,
and mine managers,, whose recommendations were necessary before
they could undergo their trade test and receive a blasting certifi-
cate. (82) In addition, the system of awarding certificates was
grossly abused, as the events during the 19O7 miners' strike
clearly illustrated, when inadequately-trained miners* some of
whom had had a mere two weeks1 instruction underground, were
awarded these certificates.(83) Miners even wished to elect one-
third of the mining inspectors so that they could report infringe-
ments of the mining regulations with impunity. Their fears were
corroborated by Robert Nelson Kotze, the government mining
inspector, when he gave evidence before the Select Committee on
Working of Miner Phthisis Act in 1914:
He [the mineworker] runs the risk of either being fired by the
inspector£for not reporting that his. water pipe was defective}
or of getting the sack for complaining.(84)
. w e r e • • •.-.-.•
Mine managers/frequently appointed as mining inspectors,
• former
with the result that mineworkers believed that the/'would favour
management if they reported infringements of mining regulations.(85)
A typical case occurred in 1912 when the management of Crown Mines
was charged with contravening the regulations by obliging a
ganger to supervise too many Africans. The magistrate, accompanied.'•,
by inspectors and three memebers of the T.M.A., inspected the mine :v:
and all agreed that the ganger had nore work 'than he could . •
reasonable be expected to perform.• • Notwithstanding this evidence,
the magistrate did not find the management guilty, because the
manager, acting on the chief inspector's advice, after the inspection
relieved the ganger of his work-load by employing additional white
gangers. In giving evidence the chief magistrate stated that
the manager was always amenable to suggestions made by the department
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.of mines. But the T.M.A. considered that the chief inspector had
deliberately abetted the management in averting prosecution.(86)
The alleged bias of inspectors also led the T.M.A, to reiterate its
request for the reintroduction of the republican Inquest Law because
the evidence of inspectors had an important bearing on the compensation .
awarded to dependents of deceased workers.(87)
. Malan acknowledged that the hostility between mine management
and mine workers was engendered partly by the 'absence of human touch1.."
1
 (88) The Chamber was sensitive about this and made enough apologetic
statements to confirm the view held by the public that 'managers are
hard taskmasters indifferent to the welfare of the workers and that, , :
in fact, there is something radically wrong on the mines which should
. be remedied'•(89) .
Despite requests since 1907 that mining companies abolish the
^practice of giving a worker twenty-four hours' instead of a month's
notice to vacate a house occupied on the mines, the practice was still
in vogue in 1913,(90) Insecurity, of house-tenure was one of the
major reasons deterring immigrant mineworkers from bringing their
families to South Africa.(91) Another result was that mineworkers
tended to treat houses on the mines as 'camps -rather than homes'.(92)
In addition, rather than face ejection at such short notice, mineworkers
preferred to live1 in their own private homes and to travel to work,
despite the fact that these expenses added to their already high cost
of living'. Furthermore mineworkers were often summarily dismissed,
through no fault of their own, because mine captains and mine managers
(who also changed jobs frequently) when moving to a new mine dismissed
employees and replaced them by workers who followed them.(93)
The Mines and Works Act of 1911 legalised certain essential
work being performed on Sundays. But allegations that the regulations
were being infringed was one of the reasons which led to the appoint-
ment of the Sunday Observance Commission of 1911.(94) Many miners
and artisans believed that no work whatsoever should be performed on
Sundays^ because it Was the one day on which workman and his family -;
could see their friends or enjoy family life.(95) The Sunday Ob- ;
seirvance Commission recommended that Sunday minework should be re-
duced to the barest minimum, that mines should be given three years to
modify essential reduction processess to prevent their being undertaken
on Sundays, and that all new mines should be. prohibited from performing
any reduction work at all on this day. It had become the practice on
certain mines to regard Sunday as a normal working day, and men were
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frightened to object for fear of losing their jobs,(96) The shift
system,when abused, all affected the mineworker's enjoyment of Sunday,
because after working until midnight on Saturdays he was expected to
resume work on Sunday at midnight ..(97) .-. -j.v
Barry,in a confidential letter to Merriman, observed that.'
•all classes' of underground work were being performed, and tjiat
•many mines were deliberately breaking the law1. He attributed
excessive underground overtime and underground Sunday work, in part,
to. the contract system. ... • .
By 1913 almost all developing and more than half the stoping .
•on min*s was done under contract.(99) The mining companies provided/
miner-contractors (who did not use their own capital) with African
assistants, supplies, explosives and tools, and miner-contractors
paid the companies for these aids.(100) Often miners were.unable to
fulfil their contracts, and after paying the company its dues found that
they earned nothing and were still in debt to the company. In certaiO
cases the/companiesaugmented the wages of miner-contractors, but the
Economic Commission considered the average augmented wage of 10s. per
day too low. Through experience, but more often through good luck,
miner-contractors earned very high wages, but earnings oscillated and the
insecurity of these miners affected all mineworkers.(101)
The Economic Commission dispelled the popular misconception
that on average miners earned large sums of money which ranged from
£600 to £900 per annum. Such cases in fact occurred rarely.
The Economic Commission recommended the system of day pay be substituted
for the contract system, but that, if the latter practice continued, .
it should be attached .to a reasonable augmented minimum wage. (102)
The commissioners, in assessing the high cost of living on the Witwaters-
rand, observed that although the mineworkers • wages were 'unquestion- AL<?
ably very high', they were not excessively high in relation to the
cost of living and the nature and conditions of work.(103)
The contract system generated a restless gambling spirit amongst
miners. Sometimes miners who had contracted for certain tasks found
 ;
that the best part of the reef had already been worked. Rather than ;:
face a. difficult section which could not be mined by the agreed date, ":
they would choose to move elsewhere*(104) However if the discharge '::"
certificate - certificates which all mineworkers were obliged to -
carry and to which they strenuously objected, equating them with "
African passes - showed that: the miner had worked in one place for
only two or three weeks, employers would attribute this short tenure
to his inefficiency, and the miner would have difficulty in securing
work.(105) The. frequency with which miners changed jobs is illustrated
by the figures produced by Kotze;
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Between January and June, 1911, the Witwatersrand employed
in 53 producing mines an average of 22,180 white men,
and there were 17,754 changes, on an average of 13.3 per
cent per month. (106)
On Randfontein Central Mines, where the contract system had been
abandoned and the system of day pay subsituted, there was greater
security amongst the men with concomitant increased productivity and
stability.(107)
Additional resentment of mineworkers focussed on the sick and
benefit societies provided by the mines. Repeated representations
since 1907 led the government to appoint a Commission of Enquiry into
the Mine Benefit Funds.(108) Although the commission reported in
1911 the government ignored its findings many, of which incorporated
the trade unions1 suggestions. The workers1 major grievances were
that no matter how long they contributed to these compulsory benefit
funds, as soon as they left a mine they lost all claim on the fund.
Unemployed mineworkers had no claim on any funds to which they had
contributed and could not draw sick pay.(lO9) Unless a mineworker
actually lived on a mine the recreation facilities were valueless to
him.(110) Members of the benefit schemes were debarred from drawing
on the funds in cases when they were awarded compensation under the
Workmen's.Compensation Act, or if illness necessitated hospitalisation.
(Ill) Medical examinations were not required when men were admitted
to the benefit funds, with the result that sick and chronic invalids
coming to a new mine, but paying the same subscriptions, received
compensation from the funds.(112) All the abuses inherent in the
seventy separate benefit schemes which existed in 1910 and which
involved 24p00 workers remained a permanent source of grievance.(113)
Mineworkers, who wished the funds to be consolidated and controlled
by the government, believed that the schemes operated not in their
own interests, but for the benefit of the management of the mines
which contributed nothing to these funds.(114) • .
The lack of time that workers, had for recreation was demonstrated
by their demand for a national system and additional public holidays..
Apart from Sundays, Christmas Day and Good Friday,
no other holidays were legalised. It was only after the 1913 general. •
strike and after consultation with the government that the Chamber •
agreed to pay underground and surface workers, who had been continuously
employed for a.year on one mine^ ten days leave on half pay.(115) ;
This survey of industrial working conditions explains the bitter
comments of organised labour exemplified by an editorial in the
Worker, the official newspaper of the South African Labour Party, of
July 1913:
The white population has hardly yet realised that a
white worker (we will not deal with the black man now)
claims in this country, as he has long claimed elsewhere,
to be recognised and treated not with the intolerance
by a 'baas to a boy* but as a man and a citizen whose
right to life, liberty and competence, is as important
as his 'masterfs••(116)
Prominent men at that time, who had no connection with the
trade-union movement, recognised the undoubted legitimacy of many of •
the workers1 grievances. However it is important to stress the fact
that it was the trade-union methods of dealing with the black man which
alienated their potential supporters. For instance,William Hosken,
a former member of the Transvaal legislative assembly, was prompted
to comment:
For myself I sympathise greatly with the aims of organised
labour but I am for justice and fairplay for the black
worker as well as the white. Here in the Transvaal the
white worker refuses elemental [Sic] rights to the Native
and Coloured workers^(117)
A number of the Federation's demands had a direct but unstated connectioi
with the trade unionists fears of non-white competition, and indicate
the truth of Hosken*s judgement.
The high wages originally paid to skilled immigrant miners and
artisans as an inducement to come and work on the Witwatersrand mines
set the pattern of the wages for white industrial workers.(118)
Basing the minimum standard for skilled whites on the customary
sovereign a day, in addition, trade unionists claimed that 16s.8d*
and 10s. should be the minimum basic daily wages of semi-skilled and
unskilled white industrial workers, although the latter, they declared,
.wage
was an unfair/ . for a white married.man*(119) In contrast to the
high wages accorded white mlneworkefs, the wages of all non-whites,
(particularly Africans )9 who were originally responsible for all the
unskilled work, were infinitely lower.(120) With the establishment
in 1900 of the Witwatersrand' Native Labour Association (W.N.L. A. Van ...
organisation responsible for the. recruitment and distribution of
Africans to the companies affiliated to the Chamber of Mines, the
simple average maximum wage of these contract labourers was fixed in r. ~
1903 at 2s.3d. per day.(121)
The discrimination of the white overseas mineworkers against
non-whites was originally a class-conscious discrimination, but as
non-white workers/^c5uir?? skills and could be seen as competitors they
were discriminated against mainly for reasons of colour.(122) Overseas
miners who in the normal course of their duties had to perform a great
variety of tasks, many of which were of a menial nature, rapidly came
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to share the average South African's aversion to manual work or
'Kaffir work1 of any kind. As in other countries, the introduction
of machinery/to the dilution of the skill content of many jobs and
depreciated the operative's (or artisan's) asset of versatility. The
miner was in a far more difficult position to resist this kind of en-
croachment on his preserve than the artisan, because the nature of
mining militated against a strict definition of unskilled, semi-skilled
and-skilled minework*
 : . .;.
:'• Before the Anglo-Boer war it was the practice for one white •
miner to operate a drilling-machine, with the help of two Africans- . .: ]
Miners admitted that it took Africans no less than two weeks training
before they became competent to handle the drills on their own.
Management realised that handing over the drills to the Africans freed
the miners to undertake more supervisory work, and before the war it
became common practice for white miners to supervise two drills with
the aid of five Africans. This innovation led to strikes and white
miners reluctantly returned to work on the Primrose mine after they
were promised 25s per day instead of £1 for their additional supervisory,
responsibilities. White miners resented being forced into this
supervisory role ciaiming that it reduced their efficiency and competence
as practical all-round miners.(124) Local mining training procedures,
unlike the position overseas, produced rock-drillers rather than all-
round miners, and many overseas-trained miners found themselves unable
to use all their specialised skills except in certain more exacting
occupations. In addition, as many overseas-trained miners succumbed
to phthisis or went home'to die of the.disease, management alleged that
local standards of proficiency were dropping sharply.(125) All the :
overseas-trained miners who gave, evidence before the Mining Industry
Commission in 1907 declared their preference for the old system under >
which each miner had charge of a single drilling-machine; but locally =*
- trained miners, who had not gone through the mill, preferred their .
supervisory roles.(126) In the course.of time all miners, irrespect-
ive of - their training and. competence, became equated with locally-trained
rock-drill supervisors and overseers of all other occupations, such
as tramming, lashing and shovelling.(127) ;.According to a general
manager of be Beer, the occupation of supervisor was 'unfortunately... •*':
not of a nature calling for the exercise of much brain power1.(128)
The white miners therefore adopted the blasting certificate
as their bulwark- against non-white encroachment, it being the only
entrance qualification necessary to join the T.M.A. (129) Overseas
merely
miners had formerly regarded this certificate/ as an extra qualifi*
cation to fortify their all-round versatility. As blasting certificates
were in the Transvaal in practice awarded only to whites before the
mining regulations of 1911 legalised this colour bar, the possession
of this certificate was arbitrarily used to differentiate a skilled v
miner from all other miners.(130)
The artisans in contrast to miners were in a stronger position
to resist non-white encroachment by their strict definition of what '.
constituted skilled work, and the apprenticeship rules devised for the :
training of artisans. However artisans even before the Anglo-Boer
war were aware that a number of non-whites were receiving an indirect
and informal apprenticeship,and-that management Was prepared to upgrade
non-white workers-(131)
At the direct request of the Transvaal Engine Drivers1 Association
(the forerunner to the South African Engine Drivers' and Firemen's
Association) the republican government introduced laws in 1896, 1897 /^
and 1898 that engine-drivers with the responsibility of hauling men
had to be white and in possession of a certificate of competency*(132)
This provision was incorporated in the 1903 mining regulations, by the
British administration.(133) Additional colour bars were introduced
in amended mining regulations of 1906 which stipulated that all boiler-
attendants (firemen) and lift operators had to be white.(134) These
regulations theoretically reinforced the security of engine-drivers,
because they had to serve a defined period working with boilers
(or engine) before thay were allowed to take their trade test.(135)
The Chamber of Mines although opposed to the colour bar, was not
greatly perturbed by the restrictions placed on non-white winding
engine-drivers because it conceded in 1903 that there were 'practically
no coloured drivers'.(136)
In addition, the 1903 Transvaal mining regulations also confined
the semi-skilled jobs' of banksmen and onsetters to whites.(137)
Banksmen and onsetters supervised the loading and unloading of workers
and minermaterial in the cage, and gave the necessray signals to the •;
engine-drivers to raise and lower the cage. These jobs must have
been performed by a number of non-whites, because when the republican
government introduced the colour bar in these occupations in 1896 the ,;J
mineowners reacted with more concern than in the case of winding ' :.- "
engine-drivers. . Mining-house representations to the volksraad led '
to the repeal of these two restrictions in 189^(138) . •
Miners originally did not fear Africans as competitors, believing
that they did not have 'the brains enough1 to get beyond a 'certain
efficiency'.(139) The Chinese however, as experience in Australia
had indicated, were different as they had a reputation for being apt
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and willing workers.(140) South African trade unionists resisted
the introduction of Chinese manual labourers, who in terms of the
Labour Importation Ordinance of 1904 were restricted to numerous
unskilled occupations, and did so all the more strongly when it. was
realised what effect their employment-Iwas having on the distribution
of the white labour force on the mines.(141) Trade unionists alleged
that the mining regulations were-being broken; but their major grievance
was that the ratio between whites and non-whites was steadily increasing
(142) They claimed that since the advent of the Chinese^job opportun-
ities for whites on the mines were steadily diminishing - despite the
expansion of the industry - and that the ratio of white workers to
• • • . • • . • • • ' • • • •
Chinese labourers had decreased from 19 per cent to 11 per cent. (143).
They suggested that this was because white miners supervised vastly ^
increased numbers of Chinese in a. great variety of occupations. For
instance, a miner might be required to supervise as many as a hundred ;..'.
unskilled labourers on six or sevel levels. Through the delegation ».
of supervisory duties to 'boss boys1, the law was still observed, j
but only in the technical sense, because the white miner was still the
overall supervisor.(144) .
 ;
More important, however, was the fact that Africans, who again
began working on the mines in increasing numbers after the temporary
dislocation during and after the Anglo-Boer war, were used in similar
fashion to the Chinese. The experience derived from the employment
of the Chinesejin conjunction with Africans^ indicated to management
that there was nothing inherent in the African which might 'prevent1
him from doing work of a similar nature to that of whites. (145) .£-
Mining companies were dependent on local and overseas finance for .;•
capital improvements and development- But as the bulk of the ore
was of a low-grade quality yielding, relatively small returns to
investors, and as the highest item of costs was labou'r, mining directors,
particularly in.the years of depression from 1902 to 1910^ made even
greater effort to reduce labour costs or alternatively to increase
white productivity, whose output management alleged had been restricted
by trade unionism.(146) Managements efforts to introduce white . :.J .;
contract rock-drillers had been thwarted by a strike in 1903.(147) . /
In the latter half of 1902 Frederic Hugh Page Cresewell, a mine j
manager who later became the leader of the S.A.L.P. in parliament,
conducted experiments with unskilled white labour.When he. required
White miners to supervise more than two drilling-machines manned
by whites, this action precipitated a strike on the Village Main Reef
Mine.(148) White miners were well aware that rock-drilling procedures
required only a brief period of training and that aspirant miners could
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yery easily obtain blasting certificates whereupon they could be
classed and paid as skilled. Job fragmentation made white miners
fear that their would be no limit to the number of machines that-they
would be expected to supervise* Thus in 1907 when management requirec
the miners on the Knights Deep to supervise three instead of two
rock-drills, manned by Chinese or Africans, they again resorted to
striking.(149) .
Initially white workers had been encouraged to consider them-
selves the 'aristocrats' of labour. Lionel Phillips, a director of
H. Eckstein and Company, attacked the •presposterous -• idea that white'
workers should perform 'labour of a similar character1 to Africans.(150
Management's repeated references to Africans as 'mere muscular machines
and the differences in wage payments of whites and non-whites, when it
was clear that the latter were doing minework of a semi-skilled an<J
• • . ' •• * • • • • - • ' v
even of a skilled nature, must certainly have .encouraged white workers
to adopt the view that all Africans irrespective of the nature,of
their work, should be designated as unskilled and paid accordingly.(151;
Trade unionists who strongly advocated the abolition of the contract
system, did not therefore advocate the payment of 'unskilled' non-
whites in accordance with unskilled white minimum standards.(152)
Craft unionists began to advocate a white labour policy which
envisaged the segregation of Africans in reserves and their total ex-
clusion from all industrial work.(153) Until such a policy was
implemented they therefore advocated the extension of the colour bar
in such "a way that all non-whites would be debarred from handling any
form of machinery, thus precluding them from serving any indirect form
of apprenticeship.(154) Miners, in contrast to the artisans, were
•>
not in favour of dispensing with African assistants, even on the drills,
and/ not support the idea that Africans who did the nasty •rough'
manual work, which white, miners had performed overseas, should be '')
entirely excluded from, the mines. They therefore only favoured the
extension of. the colour bar.(155)
The Mines and Works Regulations of 1911 listed twenty-two
mining jobs which could be performed only by white workers in the . . J .
Transvaal and the Orange Free State.(156) These regulations laid
down inter alia that gangers, who were supervisors of groups of mine-
workers, in addition to banksmen and pnsetters, now had to be white..
(157) The Chamber of Mines resented the extension of the colour bar,
and?before the general strike commenced, made no secret of the fact
that it wished it to be revoked. The Chamber was told by legal
advisers that it should teat the regulations applicable to banksmen and
because
onsetters in court/' there was a strong possibility that they
-19-
would be declared .ultra vires. This was because the mining regulations
stipulated that in the Cape and Natal •competent1 men, who did riot
therefore necessarily have to be white, could undertake these tasks.
(158) The Chamber claimed that the employment of semi-skilled non-
whites was the necessary alternative to inefficient white labour,
the standard of which was steadily deteriorating.(15() .
After the 1907 strike,wh.en Afrikaans miners entered the mines
for the first time on a large scale as strike-breakers, the government J
tried to promote schemes to attract and; train South Africans as miners*
,-;"• (160) The sqhbol for training miners on the Wolhuter Mine, established
..in 1908, did not prove very successful. Many of the learners left :
the school before completing their indentures because of their aversion'
; to doing 'Kaffir- work.(161) The danger of phthisis was also a
'powerful factor deterring whites from undertaking mining.(162)
Harry Ross-Skinner,, a director.of E.R.P.M.^ inadvertently showed why
the majority of miners needed few skills, and why Africans were capable
of performing these tasks in/answer to a question put to him by the
Select Committee on European and.Labour Conditions in 1913:
What is the skilled work about? It is looking at the natives
while they work the drills - when the natives are raw - when
new gangs of natives come in and are allowed to the working
places, the white overseer has to hustle after them and get
them into their positions, see that they can get the proper"
position of the holes. - He has got to teach the native to
use his hammer, and it is a rather difficult thing'to* hit a
piece of steel with a hammer without hitting your fingers.
He has all that work to do.(163)
Several mining engineers attributed the inefficiency of miners to the
fact that there was no competition from Africans. (164 ) This ex-
planation had some measure of truth. Safeguarded by the colout bar,
the T.M.A. was prepared to lower its standards, and contrary to past ::
requests, asked that a white mirier be permitted to receive his blasting
certificate after a mere nine months! training.(165)
".. • Contrary to expectation the Africans, particularly those from
 :;
Portuguese East Africa, who in 1913 comprised approximately 96,000 '•
out of a total of 254,495 non^white, mineworkers were considered as good,
if not better, supervisors fhan whites.(166) In spite of the colour
bar the scope for underground white employment seemed to be decreasing
as Africans were increasingly employed in semi-skilled occupations.
In 1907 the Chamber employed 2,234 white miners to supervise 1,890
machines, but by 1913 '2,207. or 200 less • were supervising*" 4,781
rock-drills handled by Afripans. By 1913 it was customary for white
•skilled labourers1 to supervise six to ten machines. In addition,
the Chamber continued to reduce the numbers of white gangers by
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replacing them with intermediary African 'boss boys1.(167)
-.' From 1910 displacement of skilled artisans by Africans also
occurred on the surface with the electrification of the mines-
Many firemen found themselves redundant,, while semi-skilled wprk/on
the electricity plants was done by Africans.(168) Africans also
replaced white stationary engine-drivers, and,, for instance, on the
Randfontein group of mines it was estimated that from 1911 to 1913
.. , .
 £.. . i. • /in this occupation * •'''.' i
the number of whites/decreased fr6m forty to seventeen or eighteen.
' 7
In 1912 the system of recruiting Africans was expanded by the
establishment of the Native Recruiting (ioporation, which had the sole
rights to recruit African labour in the Union and the High Commission
territories, and as its activities increased trade-union criticism
the contract system grew more vociferous. The threat of 'unfair1
•docile1 competition loomed large as increasing numbers of Africans were
employed in semi-skilled and skilled occupations at unskilled contract
rates.(170) ; .
Trade unionists were not the sole critics of the contract
system. The Economic Commission submitted that 'native labour in
South Africa is so cheap that it has come to be looked upon as a
thing which can be used extravagantly1. (171) Although the Chamber
of Nines contended that the colour bar in the mining regulations was
its major obstacle in permitting the advancement of Africans, Barry
differed. In 1913 he wrote:
 :
Native labour and the Colour bar.
The Idea is that we must give the Native a chance to progress
. , and that we could economically employ him much more widely if
. allowed to do so. Of course there is nothing philanthropic
1
 in the minds of the Industrial Controllers.
By May 1914 Barry was urging that the Chamber should withdraw its
•rotten schedule of rates' and that labour should be 'attracted1 and
not 'recruited'. His subsequent indictment of the Chamber was even
s t r o n g e r : • . ' • " ; . ' " :. ' ' •'• -"•'".•'. '•'•• ','.' ""'•'. ''"'•••
Although the Mine Owner shouts at the Government about withdrawir
•The Colour Bar' he proves himself absolutely insincere by his
restriction of pay on every class of native worker - this -
setting up a far stronger and wider 'bar' than any provided by
the Regulation.(172)
White workers who had always been encouraged to consider them-
selves the 'aristocrats of labour' could not possible compete with
* * -21-
. Africans at their contract rates of pay.(173) In this particular respect
trade unionists were justified in criticising the contract system, and ,."
their demand for its abolition was in full accordance with the world-
wide trade-union-movement. In South Africa the dichotemy between
; trade-union principle and.practice revealed itself in the white
workers1 refusal to compete with Africans, even at equal rates of pay, v •:
because of their consideration that Africans were intruders in the "\..:'-'V.
; .'proper sphere of the white manli(174) - This rather than unfair compe-;
tition, was the major reason why organised labour opposed the contract -
system. , . . .
•The Workers1 Charter1 which demancfed a proper system of . '
apprenticeship had merit of its own without touching on the problem of
non-white encroachment. There were abuses in the existing apprentice-
r^ship system/ White apprentices were often obliged- to perform work
normally done by artisans at far.lower wages.(175) After apprentices . '
had served their indentures employers frequently continued to pay them
lower wages than the union minimum rates.(176) In South Africa .
the training and educational standards of apprentices were inferior
. to those of apprentices in pritain, and the admission of these :
journeymen into the skilled unions often tended to lower the antici- ;
pated standards and brought the trades into disrepute.(177)
Despite abuses in the existing apprenticehip practices, the unstated
intention of the demand for legally regulating the apprenticeship j
system was to preserve skilled vocations for whites as • the inheritance
of white men1.(178) Trade unionists, by stipulating that apprentices
should have a high educational standard, indirectly hoped to reinforce
^their exclusive position, and the 1922 Apprenticeship Act satisfied
this demand.(179)
Another solution to non-white encroachment was the demand for
the establishment of minimum wage boards which would establish £1,
16s.8d. and 10s for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers res-
pectively. (180) This was in contrast to wage boards in other countries
which/wereusually founded to protect workers in the fsweated trades'•
In 1910 Bill Andrews, organiser of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers,
stated that if a standard of minimum wage was fixed there would be no
•injustice to any man1.(181) Not all the A.S.E. office-bearers
agreed with Andrews/ minimum waqe boards should apply to non-whites
as well.(182) All trade unionists however were adamant that minimum
wages should be fixed according to white standards only. (183)
The Economic Commission recognised that many of the trade unionists who
insisted on subsistence wages fixed in accordance with white standards,
but applicable to all races, wished however to exclude all non-whites ,
from industrial work entirely. The Commissioners rejected this .idea
completely and stated that • a complete economic collapse as disastrous
to white labour as to all other interests'would result if such a
system were introduced.(184) ;
: '... The T.M.A., cognisant of the futility of white unskilled :,
workers competing directly with African even at acceptable white
unskilled rates, insisted that certain jobs, which had formerly been
classified as unskilled and which white workers had been willing to *
perform, should be reclassified as semi-skilled and should be paid in
accordance with white semi-skilled rates. In addition, they requested
the extension of the colour bar in these particular occupations, which .
included tramming, a job usually-performed by Africans under white
supervision or by unskilled indigent white workers.C185)
White craftsmen on tjie Witwatersrand did receive high wages.
The wages of members" of the South African Typographical Union varied
from £6 to £8 per week, while members of the A.S.E. received the
minimum district wage of £1 per day (£6 per week). The Economic
Commission concluded:
When allowance is made for the cost of living as a whole, it""
would seem that the workman on the Witwatersrand is better off
than the workman in America and much better off than the workman
in Europe.(186) .
Miners, the majority of whom were employed under contract,
besides living in 'constant fear of displacemnet•, believed that the
• • - ' • • - • - • : " ' • . - •
guaranteed contract rates of 10s, or 12s.6d. per day would become com
practice, and would take the place of the customary minimum Standard
of 20so per day.(187) The insecurity of miners permeated the entire •
labour fource on the Witwatersrand, affecting even the skilled artisans^
who feared that their wages would also ibe reduced. This phenomenon
evoked.comment by the Economic Commission, which submitted that
'every drop In the demand for labour adds to the sense of insecurity1*
(188)
 • .. ,
v
 K';;: :*nd ; •; "• •. .V-V';: :X'"'. .V'^:.y VV:.;>:V
* During; 1912/the beginning of 1913 unemployment of white workers
was becoming a permanent factor in their daily lives. James . ,
Thompson Bain,the organiser of the Federation, claimed that regular
employment was the exception rather than the rule, and that .on average
men worked only eight months of the year.(189) On 21 April 1913
he told the Select Committee on European Employment and Labour
Conditions that 'not during the whole of this last 20 years, have
- 2 3 - . •
there been so many men in one trade or calling out of work than at
the present time.(190) Charles Mussared, a prominent official of the -
. A.S.E.,. wrote^ • The man who talks about holding a. permanent position
must justly be accused of having a bee in his bonnet.•(191)
- George Kendall, the organiser of the A.S.E.^ in October 1912 attributed
..the unemployment to the !steady entrenchment( policy of management,
, while in April 1913 George Steer, the secretary of the executive of the
. A.S.E., believed that the Transvaal was on the verge of a depression
•previously not experienced.'(192)
Conditions of employment of white workers on the Witwatersrand.,
had never been salubrious. But the.high wages accorded skilled
workers and their general security in the past, in the knowledge that
they had a monopoly of skilled work, had been sufficient to allay most
other grievances. By 1913 however this security was strongly
challenged by the steady advancement of non-whites in semi-skilled
and even skilled jobs. In- this atmosphere.the grievances of all
white workers were magnified, particularly by socialist organisers of
the A.S.E., the Federation and the T.M.A.t Kendall, Matheirs and Bain
of
respectively. Retrenchment, unemployment; and fear/all-round wage
reductions fomented discontent. Added resentment was provided by the
government's lethargy in improving working conditions, and this
engendered a climate of hostility and militancy, unknown before on such
a large scale, directed against all employers of labour. It is
important to stress the fact that one of the major grievances of
mineworkers was the failure by the management of all the mines to give
,v any recognition to the trade unions. The fears of miners that the
* average minimum wages were being slowly reduced highlighted the
incidence of•phthisis, which had always been prevalent, but which
-now loomed larger because.men were not prepared to risk their lives
for the little pay they were receiving. it was the government's slow
reaction to these conditions which made all workers believe that it
was indifferent to their welfare and their only redress was to resort
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